

סגרירות ישראל - ווסינגטון

אל: המסרד

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דף...!... מתוך... 3. דפים

סווג בטחוני. 13/5.....

בהול
.....דחיפות

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אל : רוה"ם, שה"ת.

דע : מנכ"ל, ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א.

פגישת איגלבוורגר - ארנס

איגלבורגר קרא לשגריר לפגישה דחופה ב-11:30 (מילא את מקומו של סולץ שנמצא עם הנשיא מרקוס). מסר שהוא מדבר בשמו של הנשיא, והקריא את הנייר המצ"ב. מסר שמתח"ד עומד לפרסם הודעה ברוח דומה.

השגריר מתח בתוקף נגד הטענה שישראל הטעתה את ארה"ב ושהפרה את ההסכם. כמו כן, שלל את ההערכה שפעולת צה"ל אינה חיובית, והדגיש את חיוניותה בזמן זה. פרסי השיחה יוברקו בהמשך. כנ"ל הודעת דובר מחמ"ד.

נתיבה

הנה נאמר לנו כי כל המעשים
האלו הם מעשי אדם אחד

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UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER
TALKING POINTS FOR USE WITH
AMBASSADOR ARENS

- The President and the Secretary have instructed me to call you in to hear our views on Israel's decision to take military control of Beirut.
- We regard your action as directly contrary to a series of assurances made in the course of the summer by the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister that Israel had no intention of occupying West Beirut.
- More immediately, what the IDF has done in the last 36 or so hours is contrary to statements made to Ambassador Draper that IDF moves were limited and designed solely to keep the situation calm.
- I must tell you that Israel's credibility has been severely damaged here in Washington by recent Israeli actions in West Beirut.
- We took those statements at face value, and conducted ourselves over the past 24 hours on the basis of those assurances. As a consequence, we appear to some to be the victim of a deliberate deception by Israel. Others are accusing us of having conspired with Israel all along to bring about the capture of West Beirut.
- The Secretary asked you yesterday to convey our deep conviction that Israel should seriously consider this situation and promptly pull back. We said we wanted to hear from you. Today we find the IDF consolidating its positions. I want to reiterate strongly that the occupation by Israel of an Arab capital is a grave political mistake with far-reaching symbolic and concrete implications of the most dangerous sort.
- More immediately, the IDF military control of West Beirut threatens to block the very positive trend of Lebanese political reconciliation that has appeared in the wake of President-elect Gemayel's death. Specifically, the chances for a successful outcome of another election before Sarkis' term expires next Thursday are directly impeded by Israel's occupation of West Beirut.
- I am instructed to ask Israel to have its forces out of West Beirut and back to the previous ceasefire lines immediately. We will also support Lebanon's request that the Security Council adopt a resolution opposing Israel's action and calling for withdrawal from West Beirut. If we can delay action in the Security Council on that resolution until

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tomorrow, we shall do so. If we cannot, we will vote for a resolution today -- assuming it is satisfactory to us.

- We will also be making a strong public statement today here in Washington.
- Finally, I have to tell you that we are outraged by the shot fired at a U.S. Marine on American Embassy property by an Israeli colonel. This comes after we conveyed to you our deep concern for the safety of our people at our chancery in West Beirut and artillery shells began falling near the chancery. Your response was to assure us that "strict instructions" had been issued to the IDF to avoid endangering any foreign embassy and particularly the American Embassy. Then your officer fired on our Marine at what was clearly marked as and known to be the American Embassy. We want an explanation from Israel.

9/16/82

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סוג בטהוני... סודי
דחפות... גבול...
תאריך ד"ח
... 363 ... מס' סבוק

אל : רוה"ם, שה"ח.

דע : מנכ"ל, ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א.

בהמשך לשיחת איגלבורגר - ארנס

נוכחים : איגלבורגר, וליוטס, היל, רפאל, ארנס ורח"ם.

Eagleburger: I called you in under instruction of the President. Secretary Shultz is with President Marcos; otherwise he would have conveyed the following message himself.

(Reads Talking Points)

Arens: I'm not sure you guys know what you're doing. Yesterday when I talked to the Secretary, you raised this business of Israeli deception. I don't know where it's coming from, but some people are trying to build this up.

I explained to the Secretary yesterday; the Prime Minister of Israel, unlike most of us, is a man from ^{the} classical tradition. He is a man of honor, a man who keeps his word. What is being said here about his misleading you is completely false.

The P.M. did not say "precautionary measures". I looked back at the transcript - it appears to have been taken down by a stenographer - and there are no such words from the P.M. So why this business of deception?

I don't know who it is, or why it is. I can only hope we're dealing with a misunderstanding.

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Veliotis: I believe the word that was used yesterday was "limited."

Arens: No. This is completely false. I can't understand how you could say this after I read over the phone ^{the} section of the transcript to the Secretary.

Eagleburger: The Secretary is personally responsible for these Talking Points.

Arens: Then I'm really baffled.

Let's talk about substance. As I said to the Secretary, we have a difference of evaluation -- a difference of opinion on what's happening on the ground.

We felt we had to move in quickly into W. Beirut in the wake of Bashir's assassination.

Eagleburger: We don't disagree that some action was necessary. The Secretary feels, however, that the Lebanese army could have handled this.

Arens: Well, let me say something I didn't spell out ^{yesterday} for fear of sound ^{ing} arrogant. I don't know where you get your impression of the Lebanese Army. So far it hasn't done a thing. Our guys did the fighting, our guys got killed.

Eagleburger: (After reading Talking Points). Right now the UN is considering a resolution asking your forces to depart from W-. Beirut. We'll try to delay it for 24 hours, but if it comes up we'll support it.

Arens: Before I came here, I called Shamir. He told me the situation in Beirut is now quiet. He also told me we coordinated with the Lebanese Army.

I don't know what to make of this business about being misled. That's a fabrication. Now you're going to make things worse by supporting a UN resolution put forth by the guys who killed Bashir. That's against your interest. Why do it? It doesn't help your objectives, and it's not going to help get a stable government in place.

Our common objectives are attainable, but we've got to work together and not at cross-purposes. We should avoid this openly confrontational mode. If you think this will scare us, you're wrong.

Eagleburger: The paper speaks for itself. I want to add, however, that there isn't any deus ex machina out there working to destroy your credibility. On the basis of Draper's report, we got the impression that your action will be of a limited nature. Now we find that you're spread throughout West Beirut -- not just the crossing points. If there's been any doubt what our position would be once you did this, then we've been at fault.

As to our differing estimates of the situation. Shultz said the Lebanese could manage the situation. No one doubts they are not as capable as the Israelis, but that doesn't mean they couldn't have

handled this. Our evaluation is that they could have -- now we'll never know who was right. Your action has made that impossible.

You may know what you're doing vis-a-vis specific objectives in W. Beirut, but maybe not vis-a-vis the larger picture. You know we objected to your going in; Lewis and Draper have been telling you this for months. Our response shouldn't come as a surprise.

Arens: (Understated): Actually it comes as a shock.

Eagleburger: It shouldn't.

Arens: All our statements in recent months involved the removal of the PLO terrorists from W. Beirut. We differed on one question: Does it require Israeli pressure on W. Beirut to achieve this objective? That was the only subject we discussed. We preferred, of course, to get them out by negotiations, particularly because we expected casualties. But this subject was gone when the PLO was done. We never said we wouldn't go in even if Bashir was assassinated and the whole situation in Lebanon was changed. To couple these two things (the situation during the PLO pullout and the situation after Bashir's assassination) is wrong.

Eagleburger: You argue it like a lawyer would, and that's counter-productive. But let me take your argument to its logical end. If our discussion during the PLO phase concerned whether or not you should

go in, can any rational man assume that once the PLO was out of Beirut, Israel would then go in? That's not logical. You have to be a lawyer to make that argument.

Arens: I'm not a lawyer, I'm an engineer. But in light of what happened let me ask you this: Do you think that if Bashir was alive, we would have gone in?

Eagleburger: No, of course not. But that doesn't justify your move.

Arens: You agreed with us that the IDF is the only responsible force able to stabilize the situation. I read the PM's words to Sec. Shultz. Maybe Draper garbled it up.

Eagleburger: We could accept your initial move, as long as they were measured.

Arens: Clearly Sec. Shultz chose to disregard the points I read him over the telephone. I don't understand why.

As to the incident with the U.S. marine, I want to offer my personal apologies. Obviously no harm was meant.

Netanyahu: It's now almost 12 noon. Could you tell us if the State Dept. briefing will refer to the so-called deception?

Eagleburger: (Reads briefing draft which included phrase about Israeli action being "contrary to assurances")

Netanyahu: If there's still time, I would suggest you delete this, particularly the Draper business. Otherwise you'll give us no choice but to defend our credibility by setting the record straight. We'll end up in a shooting war with each other, and that's not good for either of us.

Arens: (After Netanyahu remarked to him in Hebrew): I think that's right. You may leave us no choice but to make the PM-Draper transcript public to put things straight.

Eagleburger: Go ahead, although I don't think the press briefing will include a reference to the PM's conversation. The whole thing is getting very sticky. The French have said their mission is surrounded by Israeli tanks. The French and Italian Embassies have been hit by shells.

Arens: All this merely confirms what we've been telling you. A few weeks ago I met with the Secretary and told him that before the Palestinian problem can be addressed we've got to clear up the situation in Lebanon. First things first! Rather than tying these two things in a package we should take them one by one. Coupling the Lebanese situation with the future of Judea; Samaria and Gaza may get you some short-run success, but in the long run we won't get anywhere. I can only suggest you look back over

the last few weeks and reconsider.

Eagleburger: I guess that's another area where we'll have to differ in our evaluation.

נחמיהו

שהם סלשה יהג סומד שדכס אנל אנל
 רובין ג'ין ציבין א צבא י/ליכס אלל רם אלן

Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Yitzhak Shamir
and
Minister of Defence, Mr. Ariel Sharon
with
U.S. Ambassador, Mr. Morris Draper

Friday, September 17, 1982, 12:30 noon
Foreign Ministry, Jerusalem

Present:

For Israel

Dr. Y. Ben-Meir
Mr. D. Kimche
Mr. H. Bar-On
Aluf Y. Sagi
Aluf A. Tamir
Dr. E. Rubenstein
Mr. A. Shalom
Mr. Y. Ben-Aharon
Mr. A. Pazner

others

For USA

Mr. Flatten
Col. Raines
Mr. Scott

H.E. MR. SHAMIR: Before we start, I will read the resolution of the government in its meeting of yesterday, because this resolution is a response to the American demands and the American statements of yesterday, and it is the framework in which we will have to find solutions and arrangements for the situation in Beirut:

"Following the assassination of President-elect Bashir Gemayel, the IDF took up positions in West Beirut in order to prevent the danger of violence, bloodshed and anarchy while about 2000 terrorists equipped with modern weapons remained in West Beirut, thus blatantly violating the departure agreement. This danger was

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indeed averted.

"The Government of Israel will instruct the IDF to evacuate these positions when the Lebanese Army will be ready to assume control over them in coordination with the IDF in order to ensure public order and security."

I assume that you know this resolution. If you want to say something or to put some questions about it, please.

H.E. MR. DRAPER: When I heard the communique last night, the last sentence of the communique, I think, offers a constructive way to go forward. I characterize that -

H.E. MR. SHARON: What do you mean "the last" one? What do you mean "the last sentence"? It's one resolution.

MR. DRAPER: Yes, I think the communique offers a constructive -

MR. SHARON: The communique?

MR. DRAPER: The last sentence does say that you are prepared to turn over to the Lebanese Army -

MR. SHARON: That's only one line. There is the communique.

MR. DRAPER: Yes. I am not taking issue with the communique. It seems to me that the outcome of the communique offers a way to discuss constructively how we might go forward and I characterized that in a report to Washington -

DR. BEN-MEIR: As constructive?

MR. DRAPER: Constructive, yes.

MR. SHARON: I don't think that one can draw any line between the first part and the second part. It is all one communique. I don't know what you mean "the last sentence is a constructive sentence." That is the Cabinet resolution; it is one resolution. It's not part A

and Part B. One is the result of the other. The main, constructive, saving operations, was the operation that started two days ago in order to save Beirut, and many lives there. And it can be said, if the Lebanese army, in coordination with the Israeli forces, direct coordination, will be able to take over. It is exactly what I told you yesterday. We can move now and we will be very glad if they can take Shamra, Shatilla, Pakhani.

MR. SHAMIR: If you want, Arik, to elaborate these proposals, these decisions, please. How do you see it in a practical way?

MR. SHARON: What I thought is, after the operation that we started, which we regard to be maybe of the most important actions that have been taken, in the crucial minute, as I told you yesterday, we will be very glad that the Lebanese army will participate. We were helping the Lebanese army since the beginning of their movement forward to move into West Beirut. Without it, they would not have moved even one yard forward. I don't speak about a mile. Not even one yard. We, together with them, in close coordination between General Hamdan and general Drori, step by step, gradually, with our encouragement and help, they moved forward, a few hundred yards.

We, of course, will be willing that they will proceed with that, and we will be glad that that will be coordinated and they will come there and will do all these mopping up operations.

But the way, it is very interesting, yesterday you were telling us that the Lebanese army was demanding from Mr. Wazzan that the Israeli forces will withdraw, because they want to go in. So I checked our material this morning and it is very interesting - just

now in the helicopter coming here - I found a very interesting paper of our intelligence, I really found a request from Prime Minister Wazzan that the Israeli forces will withdraw. But it was very interesting. The request came not from the army but the request came from one of the most known, and I wouldn't like to name it, commanders of the terrorist organization, and they were applying to Prime Minister Wazzan and asking him to take all the necessary steps, mostly through the Americans, in order to bring the Israeli troops out of West Beirut. He was very specific about it. He went into details and described why it is so urgent, because he says that the terrorists, of which he is the commander, were suffering heavy casualties - and he speaks about terrorists - from our troops and some of them were surrounded and they cannot get out. So he was calling Prime Minister Wazzan to use all the channels, and he reminded our American Friends to convince the Israelis to withdraw.

So, first of all, I was glad that part of what you said, I found. I found the request from Prime Minister Wazzan. He got the request, but the request came from the commander of the terrorists.

But in order to come back to the point: we will be willing that the Lebanese army will come in, and I think it is important that our commander, General Drori, will meet with General Hamdan and any other. It can be on any level, if it is on the military level, and they will coordinate how the Lebanese army is moving in to participate in these mopping up operations. Because the situation is that there are parts or quarters of the town, which are kept by the terrorists. So the Lebanese army will go in. Why should we do it? The Lebanese

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army will go in; or convince them or will attack them, and we can start immediately. And we can point out all the places and parts of the town where they can act. We are not going to create any barrier between the terrorists and themselves. As a matter of fact, at the present time, they can act freely in Arj el-Barajne; they can act freely in Shatilla, because they are on the boundaries of Shatilla. They can act in Sabra. They can act in Fakhani, because they are really neighboring now Fakhani. But I would say it is important to coordinate.

So, first of all, we will be willing to give them all the necessary information, because why should they suffer heavy casualties? We paid already for it. So we got information. We will supply them all the information that we know. We will tell them every detail about the location of our troops, so they will be able to be careful while operating there. They will not have to cross through any of our road blocks. They can just start their attack immediately, and I would say, the earlier they start, the better.

So if the coordination will be on the military level, because local commanders and they are working very well together already for several weeks, very close contact, relations and so on. The Lebanese army asked several times for our help and support and they got it every time that they asked. No problem.

If that will have to involve any political level, so, as we talked yesterday, our General Drori is not allowed. He is a soldier. So he cannot negotiate anything, any political part, so if you would like to join such a meeting, I will join the meeting, so it will be a

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meeting between the Lebanese, our local commander, yourself, Morris Draper, and myself. That, I would say, so long as Wazzan is still acting as Prime Minister. Once he is not any more Prime Minister - I am expressing my personal opinion now - we always appreciate so much your support and help, but talks will be direct talks. We are going to talk to the Lebanese when there will be a president-elect, or already an acting president. We will talk to the president or a representative of the president - a direct talk. We will be very glad for any participation, but the talks will be, and the contact will be direct contact, and if they will have a problem, they will talk to us, exactly as the late president-elect, Bashir Gemayel, talked to us. We know already how to do it because we did it already.

We can start immediately, any time you would like to start, with the entrance of the Lebanese army. Can they start today, the Lebanese army?

MR. DRAPER: I think we ought to move fast.

MR. SHAMIR: I think that the first stage has to be the entrance of the Lebanese army, after coordination with our people there in Beirut, in these areas. This will be the first stage.

MR. DRAPER: Well, let's go down to some details on this. Before I left for Israel yesterday, I said it was going to be necessary to have a full commitment, a political commitment, from Wazzan and others to put the Lebanese army into these positions. Now, in practical terms, the appearances of whatever the Lebanese army and security forces does is very important. If it/^{is the} appearance of the Lebanese army acting as an instrument of the IDF in going in, that's going to be

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negative and it may not be workable. So, it seems to me that when we talked last night about if the Lebanese could go into Fakhani, through routes that are available, it is also going to be desirable and necessary that the IDF pull back from some of these positions.

MR. SHARON: I don't know if we have got here a map - We are not in Fakhani.

MR. DRAPER: I know. That.

MR. SHARON: And there is no reason for us to move even one step because we are not in the Fakhani. When they will finish their duties and they would like to move forward, they will come to a place where our forces are deployed, so we will move them. You know, I must tell you one thing, Mr. Draper; I just don't understand what are you looking for? Do you want the terrorists to stay? Are you afraid that somebody will think that you were in collusion with us? Deny it. We denied it.

MR. DRAPER: I think our basic objectives are the same, and I said this consistently. We want -

MR. SHARON: There are thousands of terrorists in Beirut. What is your interest? Is your interest that they will stay there? Do you think that?

MR. DRAPER: I think YOU KNOW me better than that. Our interest is: we want to see a safe and secure, neutralized Beirut.

MR. SHARON: What do you mean "Neutralized"? If the terrorists are there, you think the meaning of that is that Beirut is neutralized? If the terrorists are there? (Indicating map) As far as I understand the meaning of this term, it is that we don't have anybody there, I would say: not Israelis and not terrorists. But do you think

that if the terrorists are there and we are out, so Beirut is neutralized? I am trying; I thought for hours: what is the American idea? Do you want the terrorists to stay there? Are you going to send troops for this mopping up operation? Do you believe for a minute that the Lebanese army will be able to fight? As a matter of fact, they are fighting. We had already, I can tell you, we had six people killed and 109 people wounded. We had several tanks destroyed. A war is going on there and who is acting? Ahmed Jabrin's group and, I would say, Habash groups, and the Fatah groups; all of them are acting, getting instructions and acting, using tanks, using mortars, using anti-tank guns, all these weapons, that since the 22nd of August, according to the agreement that you achieved, had to be handed over to the Lebanese army. So who is going to clean this area or you want them to stay? So say it; then we may decide. But say it, say it.

MR. DRAPER: I will say it.

MR. SHARON: Do you want the terrorists to stay? If you want the terrorists to stay, we have to decide. Maybe it is a good idea. But say. What you are saying now, the meaning of it is that the terrorists will stay.

MR. DRAPER: No, it is not that.

MR. SHAMIR: Let me clarify something before you will answer. The suggestion was, before the assassination of Bashir, that the Lebanese government, after Bashir will take over, will take care of all the situation of Western Beirut, including all the terrorists and all these people. Now we have a new situation. What happened to Bashir, we know.

MR. SHARON: Yitzhak, I want to say one thing which may be

important. I got a message now saying that we did not find the bodies; these three bodies were missing which I referred to as killed. I have mentioned a figure of six, but there are only 3 killed and 3 were missing, and just now I got a message saying that when we managed to turn the tank, we found that the team was missing, so these are missing people, which we believe they are in the hands of the terrorists in Beirut. So I think it is very important that they release them immediately. In any case, we know that they are not dead and that's very important.

MR. SHAMIR: Let me continue. Now we have a new situation. We do not have a Lebanese government, a new government, which will be able to make this operation, to go into Western Beirut and to take care of the security in the area. Therefore, it was necessary for us to come in and to be there. We hope that in a few days a solution will be found for creating a new government, establishing a new government; a president will be elected and maybe we will come back to the situation which existed before the assassination of Bashir.

Now, the problem is: how to overcome this gap of time, this week or 3-4-5 days? Therefore, maybe the best solution is that made by Minister Sharon to coordinated the activity of our army and the Lebanese army, for them to start their presence in Western Beirut, and until this will be arranged and a new president will be elected, and we will be able to make practical arrangements.

MR. SHARON: I would like, with your permission, to say one thing: Of course, we hope that a new president will be elected and it is very important and all of us, as you know, we are looking for a

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solution for having a strong central government in Lebanon. But it might be that the terrorists will still be there. So I would like to come back to what we were talking yesterday. With this newly elected president, we then will discuss the ways and methods how to overcome these terrorists. Maybe that he will ask us to do it. Maybe he will ask us to leave. Maybe we will come into certain terms that, for instance, we will be present somewhere and they will be taking care of that, because all that will be agreed and decided after having a new president. So we have to wait. We hope that will happen. We will start a negotiation with the president, direct negotiation, direct. And I would like to emphasize "direct" negotiations, and I believe that we will be able to come into terms that will enable us to move our troops out, because you know, for weeks and months already, that I always thought that it is better not to be inside Beirut, but out of Beirut, but the situation, as Minister Shamir said, the situation changed. There will be a new president and we will discuss with them and according to those resolutions of our discussions, of course, we will take the necessary action.

MR. SHAMIR: We will act in full agreement with the new president. This is the main question now, and before a president will be elected, we have to find some transitional measures.

MR. DRAPER: Well, let me try to put it from the U.S. perspective.

MR. SHAMIR: Please.

MR. DRAPER: We have never agreed that the installation of a new president should be the turning point; everything before that counts for nothing and everything after that is important. It was our concept,

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and what we encouraged the Lebanese is to move forward from the very beginning when the PLO and the Syrians went out, and take over, neutralize West Beirut in accordance with the plan they discussed with us and also discussed with representatives of the Israel Defence Forces. The taking over key check points and so forth was part of this process and it is certainly true that the Israel Defence Forces were cooperative; To take an example, in turning over the army Shahab barracks -

MR. SHARON: Ambassador Draper, we took them like taking a child. It is not that we were giving them the camp. We were begging, asking, proposing, taking them, you know, by their hands, moving them, talking - Our officers, threatened their own lives, crossed to the other side, talked to the commanders of the terrorists and the Morabitun and others and Amal and convinced them not to hurt those troops, Lebanese troops. For instance, if you travel now in Duzai, you can see Amal soldiers armed in the street, because that was part of the agreement that was achieved by our local commander between the Lebanese troops and the Amal. What do you mean, we were cooperating? We brought them. We took them like this (by the hand). We carried them.

MR. DRAPER: It is going to be very hard to carry on a conversation if you think that when I say "cooperative" it is a pejorative word. It is a positive word. It is very positive. If I can get more than three sentences in. When I said that something was constructive in the communique, you seemed to think that I was making a distinction. My intention is to get going on some practical arrangements which will serve Israel's purposes and our purposes and Lebanese

purposes. Now, if I use the word "cooperative" in a way that means something sinister, somebody tell me. But it is not intended that way. I think frankly there was cooperation between the Lebanese army and the Israeli forces that resulted in progress by the Lebanese army and internal security forces. It was not as fast as we wanted it. It was not as fast as individual officers in the Lebanese army wanted it; not as far as ordinary people in West Beirut wanted it. But it was beginning and commencing and I think it should go on before the new president is elected and there should be steady progress day by day. And so that the people of West Beirut and all these others see that the Lebanese army is taking this over.

I think there is another important consideration that has come up in the last 36 hours. It is better, I think, for all concerned that Israel not give the appearance of occupying this city, of occupying an Arab capital. The appearances are not good. Now, before this you had absolute military control of Beirut and you have been in that position for most of the last three months. So it is not a question of your not surrounding Beirut and putting pressure where necessary. But you have had control. You have had the city in the palm of your hand all along.

MR. SHARON: How can you say "put pressure"? You want us to start shelling?

MR. DRAPER: Your people, the IDF, their presence there in overwhelming force, is a very satisfactory form of pressure. You don't have to be in the streets of West Beirut or on the Cornish for pressure.

MR. SHARON: Who will capture those 2,000 terrorists which

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are threatening us? We don't mind anybody else. I think it is also to your interest. Who is going to take care of these 2,000 armed terrorists, well equipped, with modern, sophisticated weapons which include, as has been said in the resolution of the Cabinet last night, also heavy weapons? Who is going to catch them?

MR. DRAPER: Well, the answer should be that when the 15,000 Syrians and PLO left Beirut, it was a lot easier, it was a lot easier, to deal with the remaining security problems in West Beirut, and I think that is something that ought to be left to the Lebanese, even if they are not as efficient as the IDF.

MR. SHARON: If we know that in a certain part that is surrounded by us, and we are not attacking it now; in Fakhani, Sabra, Shatilla, in our opinion there are, let's say, 1000 terrorists. Let's assume. Maybe it is 500. And we know that they are there, well equipped, with all the weapons and everything. So, do you expect us to move back now in order that some time in the future somebody will be able to take care of that? We suggest something better: we will not move in. We just keep some of these key -

MR. DRAPER: If you move back somewhat, where are they going to go?

MR. SHARON: Who?

MR. DRAPER: These terrorists. I mean, you have them surrounded. If you move back a little bit, would the terrorists go some place else?

MR. SHARON: Of course, they will move immediately, to the cities. They will go everywhere. There are no road checks. They will go to Sidon, to Tyre; they will go everywhere.

MR. DRAPER: Through Israeli lines?

MR. SHARON: We don't check anything. Thousands of vehicles are moving.

MR. SHAMIR: But it is not your intention for us to withdraw without giving up these places to the Lebanese army?

MR. DRAPER: I think, as your communique, suggests, that you can give them these forward position, to the Lebanese army.

MR. SHAMIR: In coordination.

MR. DRAPER: Oh yes; I mean, there are places - this is something that ought to be worked out in the military level - but you have your forces along the Cornish here and you have cleaned out a lot of problems here. You have your forces in the port. The Lebanese army will have the port before this, where you can start the process of going back to where you were three days ago. You can certainly work out, it seems to me, hour by hour practical arrangements with the Lebanese army to come in and take over those places.

MR. SHARON: I have a suggestion, Mr. Draper: the best thing, I would say, the Lebanese army will advance and clean the area. Once they clean the area, to a certain point where we are there, we will move from this place.

MR. DRAPER: There is a political, as opposed to the military, problem. I agree with you that would be a logical thing to do except that it might look, it might be politically impossible for the Lebanese army to be seen as, I say "might be" difficult for the Lebanese army to be seen as, let's say, acting as an instrument of the IDF.

MR. SHARON: Instrument?

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MR. DRAPER: Appearance. I go to appearances.

MR. BEN-MEIR: You are not suggesting that we withdraw in any place without the Lebanese army taking over?

MR. DRAPER: No.

MR. SHAMIR: The question of appearance, we can find a solution. If it's only appearance -

MR. DRAPER: Let's talk about specifics.

MR. SHARON: I know exactly what you mean by appearance because we discussed it yesterday. When you speak about appearance you speak about disappearing. You want us not to be in a certain place so that the Lebanese army will be able to move in. Ambassador Draper, we are in a hour of truth.

MR. DRAPER: Yes. I want to find a practical solution.

MR. SHARON: Of course, but it should be a true solution.

MR. DRAPER: True solution with lots of cooperation between us.

MR. SHARON: That's what we are looking for. We have been looking for cooperation with you for years.

MR. SHAMIR: We have to be realistic.

MR. SHARON: I want you to know and take it for granted: all the movement of the Lebanese troops by now were the result of instructions that they got not from Wazzan. He doesn't give them instructions. They got instructions from the Phalange and all that was coordinated with all of them together by our officers. There was even not one movement, even not one step by the Lebanese army. So there is no reason now that - nothing has changed. Only we came to places now where somebody should fight or bring these terrorists to surrender in order to save their lives or to attack them and kill them, in order to save

our lives. There are only two possibilities. So you say that you prefer that the Lebanese army will do it. And we agree. We prefer that the Lebanese army will attack Fakhani, Sabra, Shatilla and all the other places where the terrorists are still there. We prefer that they will do it. So, therefore, we are willing not to create any barrier whatsoever between the Lebanese troops and the terrorists. We will not be in between. We are not going to be there. The Lebanese will know. Let's look at the map for a minute. You have here Sabra. We are not sitting here now. The Lebanese army is here (indicating). So let's assume that they want to go in; they will go in. They will clean all this area. We are not here at all; we are here. When they will come in here, they will clean everything. They will capture the terrorists. They will take their weapons. I hope that they will surrender and there will not be any bloodshed there. Once they arrive here, of course we will move in order to enable them to move forward. So that is the way how one should do it.

Why do you think that we have to leave these places where we are here while the Lebanese army is here? Let the Lebanese army move inside. Once they will be approaching our troops, so in coordination our troops will move from this place. But, first of all, let them clean this area. We are not interfering. It is not our troops that are sitting, I would, say, at Galarie Saman. It is not our troops which are sitting here. It's the Lebanese soldiers. Let them go and clean the area. We are not here.

MR. SHAMIR: The most practical way is to meet the Lebanese, let the Lebanese meet -

MR. BHARON: Let's assume they don't want to meet, but they

meet every days.

MR. SHAMIR: - talk and discuss this plan.

MR. SHARON: Of course, as Mr. Shamir said, when they are coming very close, we have to discuss how to do it. Let's assume they arrive one or two blocks from the place where our troops are there, so our troops will move and they will proceed with this mopping up operation and come again after capturing, killing, I would say, taking their arms and all these things, and our troops will leave. Because we don't want to stay here. That's a realistic solution.

MR. DRAPER: When you say terrorists, are you also talking about the Lebanese private gangs, marauders, partisans, revolutionists, Marabitun, all these various other gangs who are not necessarily all Palestinians? Or just sort of collectively all these illegal groups?

MR. SHAMIR: The best way will be to discuss these details with the Lebanese. They know them very well.

MR. SHARON: I would like to point to the map. Somewhere here, for instance (Indicating) is an area kept by the Marabitun, the center of Marabitun, and together with them there are people from the Habash group, Jabrin, Fatah and so on.

MR. SHAMIR: I think this is a practical way how to implement our decision.

MR. DRAPER: I don't think that the Lebanese can - I go back to this point: if you've got something in a grip of iron and you let the Lebanese go into an already existing aperture to clean it up, these areas, the politics of it may be impossible.

DR. BEN-MEIR: They are not going to clean up; they are going to take over positions.

MR. SHAMIR: Maybe there will not be any fighting.

MR. DRAPER: I think, to some degree, and I mentioned this to the Minister last night, you can't; it is not reasonable to tell the Lebanese every little thing they have to do.

MR. SHAMIR: We discuss with them.

MR. DRAPER: They have a plan of their own.

MR. SHARON: We will not tell them. I don't suggest. But, for instance, in order to save some of the soldiers' lives - this also is very important - so we suggest that we will give them Intelligence. Maybe they would like to get air photographs. Maybe they would like to get more information. If you think it is not a good idea, so we will not give them the air photographs, the information and so on. We are not forcing them to get it at all.

MR. DRAPER: Let me put it this way. The problem is, as I visualize it, getting up to the top of the hill and over it and after that, it is all easy coasting downhill.

MR. SHARON: I don't see here any hills.

MR. DRAPER: I mean the political hills. And I am just trying to see. So I think there is a need for the Lebanese government, even before the 23rd, is seen as acting on its own, and not because it is, you know, acting at the orders of your government.

MR. SHAMIR: They have to take it into consideration that now we have a special situation. It is a kind of interregnum. I think there is a way of coordination without giving them orders.

DR. BEN-MEIR: On the contrary, we are ready to move when they come.

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MR. SHAMIR: We discuss it together. We withdraw. They will come in.

MR. DRAPER: There is a second aspect, which is more at the heart of American concerns, and that is the appearance of an occupation of West Beirut, and I think you have to do something about it.

MRL SHAMIR: In this way, we will finish.

MR. SHARON: The faster they will move, the quicker we will leave. What can be better? We agreed to leave everything.

DR. BEN-MEIR: You said that this is very constructive and along those lines the suggestions were put here practically how to work it. What seems to be the problem? Why do you feel that this is not constructive?

MR. DRAPER: It has to be my judgment that this might be politically difficult. The appearances have to be altered adequately so that they can go forward. I think that what you ought to think, in addition to this, is, you are talking about principal areas, Shatilla, Sabra, Burj el-Barajne, Fakhani and so forth. But you are also up in here [indicating]. Now, do you have to hold on to the port and the Cornish and some of these highly visible areas? The politics. You have got the Lebanese Prime Minister up about this area. He is allergic to the idea of military occupation.

MR. SHARON: Very strange that he was not allergic to being under Syrian occupation since January 1976 and under the PLO; killers, murderers.

MR. DRAPER: He was never comfortable with that either. This man is overjoyed that those people are out. But he also -

MR. SHARON: What do you suggest? Do you suggest that we will block the town around now again with all road blocks and check everyone who goes in and out and every car will be searched and again we will take measures that food and so on will not serve the terrorists? What are you suggesting?

MR. DRAPER: You handle these things very well. You were in this area, as of three days ago, and it was a very satisfactory arrangement. West Beirut was being left alone while the Lebanese made their moves to do something about it. It was a perfectly satisfactory solution. That's the basis of our disagreement between our two governments. We didn't think it was necessary and moreover we go back to this point. You went int -

MR. SHAMIR: Now we are facing a new reality.

MR. DRAPER: I will put it ^{frankly} flatly. You have got to show that you are withdrawing, back to your lines of three days ago. You just can't stay where you are and wait for the Lebanese to neutralize area by area and then move out. It's got to start -

MR. SHARON: Why not? Why can't they get in?

MR. DRAPER: I think you have got to do something of both.

MR. SHARON: To help them to move or what?

MR. DRAPER: To show that some of these places where you already neutralized, that the Lebanese army can take over there. Yes, I really do think that you have got to show that you are moving back to the lines of three days ago, even if it can't occur overnight.

MR. SHARON: I don't understand. I would say, we are situated in very specific security points, very specific, and all the rest is

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open. And it is very interesting that the terrorists now, they are avoiding now coming into these road crosses and so on and they are concentrating their efforts now, I would say, on these suburbs there and narrow streets and so on. We are not there at all. So what the Lebanese army ought to do is to move in as fast as possible immediately. They have, I would say, kilometers here to move, without any Israeli soldier. We are not there at all. And they have to clean the area, to capture or kill the terrorists and I can assure you that when they will come to our position or even close to our position, our troops will move from the position. If the Lebanese troops did it, so why should we be there?

MR. DRAPER: If they started the process of taking control of this area, for example, would you give them up the part where they -

MR. SHARON: Look, all these details should, as we said yesterday, should be worked out between the local commander.

MR. DRAPER: There are certain basics that have to be planned. There has to be a sense of movement that begins right away.

MR. SHARON: There will not be one movement right away. Take it for granted. Why should we move?

MR. DRAPER: You say, if Drori and Hamdan made an understanding on which positions the Lebanese army - That would be a sense of movement.

MR. SHARON: That's the government resolution. If the Lebanese army will take over the places where the terrorists are, we will not be there. Why should we be there?

MR. DRAPER: You said something about staying around until

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the new president is elected.

MR. SHAMIR: The general situation, but not about any specific places. There could be any specific places which are already cleaned by the Lebanese or by us, so they can go into these places and we will not be there.

MR. DRAPER: The politics and the image of the situation is - let's say that they agree to go into Sabra, the way you suggest? They have got a way to go in. Meanwhile, you are up in the most prominent area of West Beirut. They are going into Sabra. Why stay in this area that's already been neutralized? Why is it necessary?

DR. BEN-MEIR: You are asking if the Lebanese army needs it?

MR. DRAPER: Let the Lebanese army come in and take those positions and move out of these areas. There are two elements in this: One is taking over some of these positions to show appearance of movement on this and, secondly, is to continue with the effort of neutralizing the places where there are still terrorists. That's a pragmatic suggestion.

MR. SHARON: I'd like to give an answer.

MR. DRAPER: It is equally important - What I am suggesting, let me repeat, is: there are areas - here and here - that need to be neutralized. There are areas that are already neutralized. Perhaps we can talk the Lebanese into doing two things at once: basically taking over some places which are safe, areas which they can control, that amount to check points and so forth, at the same time working on these places where the camps are.

MR. SHAMIR: I want to consult with the Minister of Defence.

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(Messrs. Shamir and Sharon left the room for consultations.)

MR. SHAMIR: We have to find ways to operate. Our forces will withdraw from some places gradually and the Lebanese forces will go into these places and we have to study it exactly. We have to study and make a plan how to make it. We will propose this plan to the Lebanese forces, to the Lebanese army. They will make a plan how they imagine this operation of taking over places. Maybe you now suggest this place; maybe they will suggest another place.

MR. DRAPER: That's right.

MR. SHAMIR: In a few days, in two days, let us say, we will prepare a plan of our withdrawal and their entrance, gradually, entrance in these places and we will discuss it together. Maybe they will have other proposals. We will have some proposals. Maybe there will be differences. We will try to agree on it.

MR. SHARON: I would like only to emphasize one point here and that is the concept of the terrorists now in West Beirut. They are disappearing from the main streets and they are concentrating themselves now in these narrow streets of the city of Beirut (indicating). So for instance, though I think that the proposal that the Minister of Foreign Affairs suggested is ^a very good one, and maybe there are several places that we would like the Lebanese army to move in, but that doesn't mean that we will be able to ignore the presence of the terrorists in these, I would say, small, narrow streets there, in the middle there. So maybe we will give up there and keep other places, because when it comes to places where terrorists are, take it for granted, Ambassador Draper, we will not leave the terrorists there in Beirut. We will not

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it. So if there are, as you said, around the residence ^{of} Prime Minister Wazzan - he will not be Prime Minister then - ex-Prime Minister -

MR. SHAMIR: Who knows?

MR. SHARON: Ex-Prime Minister Wazzan, if he, for instance, as you said, he is allergic to our troops; he can't stand the smell; he is very allergic, so we will have around him nice, handsome, first-class Lebanese soldiers. We will move from his residence and we will stay in those places where the terrorists are and we will be waiting there, and I would say, believe me, eagerly that the Lebanese army will move behind us, clean this area and take it over. Because we would like to get out of the town as early as possible.

So what I would suggest is that they will not be only on the main streets. The point is not to be on the main streets. The point is to clean the town.

MR. DRAPER: I think they want to go into the town.

MR. SHARON: I think it is very good if what the Minister of Foreign Affairs suggests, that they will prepare a plan, after the holidays, Monday morning, General Drori and Brig. Hamdan will meet, will discuss and every place that they -

MR. SHAMIR: It's in their interest too.

MR. SHARON: It is our interest. We would like to concentrate our troops in the areas where the terrorists are. For instance, there are places where they can go in now. For instance, Burj el-Barajne, immediately. Shatilla, Sabra, Fakhani. We are not there at all. Let them go in. As I say, at the same time that the plan is done. Meanwhile, they go go here into these places. And so you can gain time by that.

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MR. DRAPER: I appreciate the spirit in which this has been proposed, because I think you have made some very good progress. But I have got a problem. I know that your holidays are beginning, and I know that this is very difficult to request, but I think we really ought to get the process started tonight.

MR. SHARON: Impossible. It is a holiday. We have a holiday. this is one of our holiest holidays. Nobody is holding a stopwatch. Tonight? On the eve of Rosh Hashanna?

MR. DRAPER: It is our interest; it is in our common interest of Israel and the U.S. not to have another one of these miserable drawn out Security Council problems.

MR. KINCHE: I think, if I may say a word, you talked before about perception and image. I think it is terribly important to make it very plain that there is a very strong violation. The fact that you have these 2,000 terrorists. This is what has created this situation and we wouldn't be in these areas if that hadn't happened in the first place. When we talk about perception and Security Council, one has to go to the basics, and the basics is that/^{here}there was a strong violation of all the agreement that we had all worked out together and this is the reason and this is wht this whole thing has come about. I don't think this has been made strong enough. We made it in our side. I don't think you have on your side. This needs balancing and this can also explain the fact that this is now going to be a slower process to bring our withdrawal. After all, this was a basic violation, what happened, and I think that you as Ambassador-at-large, who are working on this plan, I think it is important that you too make this point.

MR. DRAPER: The fact is that the evacuees out of Beirut were

greater in number than we thought when we started. What we can say together is that our Intelligence was at fault. And we didn't know how many are left behind or how many are organized or how many were trying to move back into some form and absorb themselves back into Lebanese society. But I do think that there was agreement, there would be cells left behind. There would be armed people left behind, Lebanese and Palestinian and the Lebanese government would have to deal, and there was no question in our minds that Bashir Gemayel was going to do it when he became president.

I don't think we should play with the numbers game of 2,000 and so forth and so on. There was always going to be somebody.

MR. SHARON: We never agreement. We warned,

MR. DRAPER: We did our best to get as many out as possible and our concern that there would be some third echelon leaders left behind to organize cells turned out not to be the case, as far as we know, so far. It hasn't been important. That part of it has been reasonably successful. In fact, we were overjoyed that we got up to the 15,000 mark. Habib used to say that 13,000 was the target. So it was more than that. So I don't think that this is the end of the world when there are these remaining bands, and, by the way, the Lebanese themselves have been plagued for more than 25 years by certain of these groups that have taken advantage of the situation and there are many of them that they'd like to take care of them too.

Let's get back to this problem. I know what it is to ask in this holy period. Is there something that could be said publicly or done to diffuse this problem? I mean, even if it takes some time to work

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out the detailed plans.

MR. SHAMIR: We can publish that we have decided to work it out.

MR. SHALOM: And within 48 hours we will be sitting together on this plan.

DR. BEN-MEIR: We have agreed in principle.

MR. SHAMIR: You can say it to the Security Council.

MR. DRAPER: It's got to be something that would be in the spirit of your communique.

MR. SHAMIR: It's in the spirit. It's in accordance.

MR. BEN-MEIR: The prime Minister suggests that they would take over the positions and help set up a detailed plan and we will work out the details.

MR. DRAPER: I think that a sentence that says something about beginning the process of withdrawing from West Beirut is a political imperative.

MR. SHAMIR: You have it in the decision: "The government of Israel will instruct the IDF to evacuate..." It means that this point we have to elaborate and work it out. In order to do it, we have to meet, to prepare plans and to see how to do it.

DR. BEN-MEIR: Within 48 hours plans will be made to effectuate this statement.

(General discussion)

MR. DRAPER: Let's get practical. I will go to the Lebanese and talk about this.

MR. SHAMIR: Sun is still holiday. Monday morning.

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MR. SHARON: Nothing will happen. Maybe some more terrorists will be killed. That will be to the benefit of all of us, for the benefit of all of us.

MR. SHAMIR: Let us hope that there will be quiet.

MR. SHARON: For every peace-loving man in the world, just to reduce a little bit this threat of these international syndicated terrorists.

DR. BEN-MEIR: Morry, by Monday morning, we can put -

MR. DRAPER: I may just be a little out-of-date with the way things may be going. But I just have a sense that if there is a significant delay in seeing that the process goes forward that there could be complications which we would all like to avoid.

MR. SHAMIR: What complications can you foresee?

MR. DRAPER: One is in New York.

MR. SHAMIR: We have to tell them that we have decided to work out some plans how to implement our decisions about the evacuation of these positions. I think it will satisfy them.

MR. DRAPER: Just before Shabbat, before anything begins - Israel has done this before - Israel has declared unilateral cease fire or unilateral end of action. There is a possibility that Israel could declare publicly and it would help to set the mood, unilaterally is withdrawing from some point.

MR. SHAMIR: Without giving up to the Lebanese army? It is contrary to the decision of the government.

MR. DRAPER: You are right, Mr. Minister, but something that would say: to begin the process, the IDF is, or Israel is turning over

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to the Lebanese army this afternoon at 6 o'clock -

MR. SHARON: Even not one single position; even not one single position.

MR. DRAPER: Some position that's not so important?

MR. SHARON: Not one single position.

MR. DRAPER: How about the most insignificant ^{military} position that you have? The most insignificant.

MR. SHARON: Even not one single position because we have a government resolution. If the government would like to change the resolution, the government will meet.

MR. DRAPER: That is in conformity with your resolution.

MR. SHARON: No, no.

MR. KIMCHE: You say, handing it over to the Lebanese?

MR. DRAPER: In coordination with the Lebanese and the IDF.

MR. SHARON: It is all connected with the mopping up operation and the cleaning of the area.

MR. DRAPER: Look, I am pragmatic. Say you have got a check point here and there. Why not turn over this? (Indicating)

MR. SHARON: Because these two check points exactly in the place where you just showed -

MR. DRAPER: Just any place..

MR. SHARON: I told you where they can go now. We are ready to hand to them Burj el-Barajne, Shatilla, Fakhani.

MR. SHAMIR: Maybe it will be satisfactory, if we will publish that we are giving up some places.

MR. SHARON: It is one-third of B eirut.

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MR. DRAPER: Let me put it another way. If the U.S. could say to the critics, look at this; this is what Israel is doing; the process is beginning; the plans will work out over the next 48 hours. That's the politics of it.

MR. SHARON: So Fakhani, Sabra, Shatilla, Burj el-Barajne.

MR. DRAPER: The hostile people will say, sure, the IDF is going to stay in West Beirut and they will let the Lebanese go and kill the Palestinians in the camps.

So,
MR. SHARON: We'll kill them. They will not be left there. You are not going to save them. You are not going to save these groups of the international terrorism.

MR. DRAPER: We are not interested in saving any of these people.

MR. SHARON: If you don't want the Lebanese to kill them, we will kill them.

MR. DRAPER: Let me reflect my government's position on this exactly.

MR. SHARON: I understood.

MR. DRAPER: If you have to stay out here for 600 years while the Lebanese neutralize this, we want you to stay out. Let the Lebanese go it. That's our position. We spent three months trying to get as many of the terrorists out as possible - safely. That was the political arrangement. So it wouldn't be necessary for you to come in. I have to reflect the views of Washington on this.

MR. SHARON: The process has started yesterday by the Cabinet resolution.

MR. DRAPER: Loo, I am trying as an instrument of my government to find a middle, practical way, to get this things started, and I am asking for a couple of things, and the spirit here has been very, very good, but I don't want us to be sandblasted by what is going to be on in New York or elsewhere. It still gets back to the fundamental position which I was using lightly: we didn't think you should come in. You should have stayed out.

MR. SHARON: You did not think or you did think. When it comes to our security, we have never asked. We will never ask. When it comes to existence and security, it is our own responsibility and we will never give it to anybody to decide for us.

(Consultations in Hebrew.)

DR. BEN-MEIR: In the discussions which were held between the Foreign Minister, the Defence Minister, with Ambassador Draper, the Ministers reiterated the decision of the Israel government of yesterday; these two chapters. As soon as possible representatives of both sides will meet and detailed plans will be worked out for the implementation of this decision.

MR. SHAMIR: Representatives of the Lebanese army and the IDF.
Will meet

MR. BEN-MEIR: /And detailed plans will be worked out for the implementation of this resolution.

MR. DRAPER: Take-over of positions.

MR. SHARON: That's what I proposed yesterday.

MR. DRAPER: We are on the same wavelength. I am just trying to work it out.

DR. BEN-MEIR: Say as soon as possible.

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MR. DRAPER: Let's make this ad referendum. I will go back and talk to Washington right now and see what I can do. If you can dictate it in English.

(Mr. Draper asked about the whereabouts of the three missing soldiers and reference was made on the map.)

MR. SHARON: I can only tell you, Mr. Draper, that Monday morning when this meeting will take place -

MR. DRAPER: This assumes that I can work something with the Lebanese -

MR. SHARON: When the meeting with the Lebanese will take place on Monday morning, no doubt that there will be achievement in this meeting. ^{It is} Not that there is going to be a meeting that both sides will drink coffee. That day, I believe that there will be a general plan that will be discussed and there will be specific points, as you asked, that if they will come in to these places - I speak about the Lebanese; I don't know what they are going to ask - but maybe already that day some of the points will be handed. And I can assure you that that will happen very fast.

MR. SHAMIR: We will come with plans.

MR. SHARON: For instance, the area near your embassy, I believe that that might be, not because it's your embassy - we are glad that your embassy is there - might be a place where on Monday our troops will move from there. So when it comes to appearance, that will serve the purpose of this problem of appearance. So they will not be on the Cornish there; they will be inside these narrow streets there because the terrorists are there. Then they will be waiting for the Lebanese

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army to come inside and to take their positions. So that will start. Ours will move; they will move behind them, replace them. The second phase will be accomplished and so on. And as fast as they will act, the results will be seen. But I can tell you that on Monday already there will be achievements. But they have to come and have to talk; they have to sit. I believe in this area, near the embassy, maybe it will be the easiest thing for us to do, because at the present time that corner there is the quietest place. Not inside, southward of the place, but on the Cornish there, that meanwhile is the quietest and it can be that they decide and they will move immediately forward; the Lebanese troops.

MR. DRAPER: Now, again, as a practical request. There is no problem if I go into West Beirut in this area, through the port?

MR. SHARON: For you? It's an open town. You remember what I was talking about: open and secure town? For you, a problem to go into town? Ambassador Draper, I'm sure that you were joking.

MR. DRAPER: I was.

MR. SHARON: I think we have agreed.

MR. DRAPER: As soon as I get the statement. It's got to be a referendum. I'll go to our office.

MR. SHAMIR: You will call Washington now?

MR. DRAPER: Yes. I will get right back to you.

MR. SHAMIR: You will call Hanan or David? But what your answer will be, if you agree, we will publish this communique.

MR. SHARON: I think it is a good one. It will bring to practical results.

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MR. DRAPER: But I go back to: I am looking for pragmatic arrangements.

MR. SHARON: It is pragmatic.

MR. DRAPER: But my people in Washington, you know, this basic position is very strong.

MR. SHARON: Tell them that this process started by the cabinet Resolution, by the plans that are worked out now and that everything is going on.

MR. DRAPER: You suggest that it is easier to convince Washington than it is to convince you?

MR. SHARON: You managed to convince us -

MR. DRAPER: Who convinced whom? (Laughter)

(The typed communique was given to Ambassador Draper.)

(Whereupon, the meeting adjourned at 2:00 p.m.)

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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סודי ביותר

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אנש

**SHULTZ: I DON'T WANT TO GO INTO WHAT IS GOING ON IN
**BEIRUT. FROM ALL ACCOUNTS, AND THE ACCOUNTS VARY, WHAT WE
**HAVE HERE IS A MASSADRE. WOMEN AND CHILDREN WERE MURDERED,
**DEFENSELESS PEOPLE WERE KILLED, MASS GRAVES. IT'S A
**HORRIBLE PICTURE.

**SO THERE'S NO POINT IN BELABORING THIS. THE BASIC FACTS
**ARE KNOWN, EVEN THOUGH THE PRECISE DETAILS ARE MISSING.
**WE'LL GET THOSE LATER.

**THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED ME TO DEMAND OF YOU THAT YOU
**GET YOUR FORCES OUT OF WEST BEIRUT. WE'VE BEEN TOLD THAT
**THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON IS PREPARED TO TAKE UP YOUR
**POSITIONS. THIS IS THE BASIC MESSAGE THE PRESIDENT WANTS
**DELIVERED.

**OUR VIEW IS THAT ALL THROUGHOUT THE HABIB NEGOTIATIONS
**THERE HAVE BEEN ASSURANCES THAT ISRAEL WON'T GO INTO WEST
**BEIRUT.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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AS YOU KNOW, WHEN YOU AND I TALKED WE URGED YOU NOT TO
GO IN. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME ISRAEL HAS GONE IN TO AN
ARAB CAPITAL, AND THERE WILL BE IMPLICATIONS AND FALLOUT
FOR THE LONG RUN.
WHEN YOU TAKE MILITARY CONTROL OVER A CITY, YOU'RE
RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT HAPPENS. I DON'T SAY YOU WANTED THIS,
BUT WHAT HAPPENS RESTS IN YOUR HANDS

WE FIND IT VERY HARD TO ACCEPT THAT THIS WOULD TAKE
PLACE IF YOU HAD REALLY ASSERTED YOURSELF IN THOSE CAMPS
I DON'T KNOW WHAT WILL HAPPEN NEXT FOR THE LEBANESE IN
THOSE CAMPS. I DO KNOW WHAT HAS HAPPENED. THE LEBANESE
WANT TO TAKE OVER WE DEMAND, WE URGE THAT YOU
WITHDRAW, THAT YOU HAND OVER YOUR POSITIONS TO THEM. I
CAN'T BELIEVE THAT IT'S IN ISRAEL'S INTEREST TO HAVE THE
WEIGHT OF THESE EVENTS HANG ON ISRAEL'S HEAD.
AGAINST EVERYBODY'S ADVICE, YOU'VE TAKEN MILITARY
CONTROL OF THE CITY. NOW WE HAVE A MASSACRE. SO WE URGE
YOU AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO HAND OVER CONTROL TO THE
LEBANESE AND TO LEAVE WEST BEIRUT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

THERE ARE MANY POSSIBILITIES FOR ACTION ONCE THIS
HAPPENS. WE NOW HAVE U.N. OBSERVERS IN BEIRUT. THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL WANTS TO EXPAND THEIR NUMBERS, BUT THEY
WOULD HAVE TO PASS THROUGH YOUR LINES.
THIS IS OUR SECOND REQUEST (THAT YOU LET THEM THROUGH).

YOU'VE NO DOUBT SEEN THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT TODAY.
HE THINKS THIS DEVELOPMENT UNDERSCORES THE NEED TO
URGENTLY DISENGAGE ALL FORCES. WE'RE WORKING TO PREPARE A
PLAN FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES, NOT JUST
ISRAEL'S

ALSO, THE PRESIDENT HAS PUT FORTH A MORE GENERAL PLAN
FOR PEACE IN THE REGION. WHATEVER YOU THINK ABOUT IT, IT
UNDERSCORES THE IMPORTANCE OF CREATING A MORE PEACEFUL
SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. IN LIGHT OF WHAT HAPPENED IN**

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

טוֹדֵי בִּירוֹר

מִנְחָל 32

דף 3
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** THE LAST FEW DAYS, THE CONSIDERATION OF THE PLAN TAKES ON
** EXTRAORDINARY IMPORTANCE. THE PRESIDENT HAS NOT ASKED YOU
** TO AGREE WITH THE PLAN, JUST TO TALK ABOUT IT. WE WILL
** PURSUE THIS FURTHER ON.

* I COME BACK TO THE BASIC POINTS YOU HAVE ASSERTED
* MILITARY CONTROL OF BEIRUT. WE URGE YOU TO LEAVE IN AN
* ORDERLY FASHION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ON THE BASIS OF WHAT
* DRAPER TELLS US, THE LEBANESE ARE PREPARED TO TAKE ON YOUR
* POSITIONS.

* WE CAN SPECULATE ON WHAT WOULD HAVE HAPPENED IF ISRAEL
* WERE NOT THERE, BUT THE FACT IS YOU ARE THERE AND IT HAS
* HAPPENED. SO WE THINK WE SHOULD TRY IT ANOTHER WAY. MAYBE
* WE NEED SOME HELPING MEASURES, SUCH AS THE U.N. OBSERVERS.

* THE PRESIDENT IS DEEPLY UPSET. I DON'T THINK ISRAEL HAS
* A STRONGER FRIEND THAN THE PRESIDENT. HE GOES THE EXTRA
* 100 MILES TO LOOK AT THINGS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF
* ISRAEL'S INTEREST AND ISRAEL'S SECURITY. HE IS DEEPLY
* DEPRESSED BY THESE EVENTS. HE FEELS THAT HAVING ASSUMED
* CONTROL OVER THE CITY, YOU SHOULD NOW HAND OVER THIS
* CONTROL TO THE LEBANESE. WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW PROMPTLY
* WHAT YOUR RESPONSE IS TO THIS REQUEST.

* AREN'T LET ME START BY SAYING THE OBVIOUS WE ARE
* HORRIFIED, MOVED, TOUCHED BY THIS EVENT JUST AS YOU ARE.
* IF ANYTHING, EVEN MORE SO, BECAUSE OF OUR PROXIMITY TO THE
* EVENT.

* I SPOKE TO DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON BEFORE I CAME HERE.
* HE TOLD ME THAT TWO AND A HALF DAYS AGO HE ASKED DRAPER TO
* ASK THE LEBANESE TO TAKE OVER THE CAMPS. THE LEBANESE ARMY
* WASN'T READY TO DO IT. YESTERDAY MANY PHALANGISTS ENTERED
* THE CAMPS FROM THE EAST. AT 2.00 O'CLOCK WE BECAME AWARE
* OF WHAT WAS HAPPENING, AND IMMEDIATELY MOVED IN AND GOT
* THE PHALANGISTS OUT. SOME OF THEM WERE KILLED IN THE
* PROCESS. THE DEFENSE MINISTER THINKS THAT IF WE HADN'T
* BEEN IN BEIRUT, THIS WOULD HAVE HAPPENED ELSEWHERE IN THE
* CITY. IN FACT EVERYWHERE ISRAELI TROOPS ARE DEPLOYED THERE
* IS QUIET. GENERAL DRORI, OUR LIAISON WITH THE LEBANESE

** ARMY, HAS NOW REACHED AN AGREEMENT WITH THEM TO LET THEM
 ** COME INTO THE CAMPS TOMORROW AT 10.00 AM. WE'RE TALKING
 ** ABOUT FAKHANI, SABRA AND SHATILLA, THE SOUTHERN PART OF
 ** WEST BEIRUT.

** ON THE QUESTION OF OVERALL WITHDRAWAL FROM WEST BEIRUT:
 ** YOU KNOW THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION. I ASSUME THAT
 ** TOMORROW'S PLANNED TRANSFER OF POSITIONS TO THE LEBANESE
 ** ARMY IS PART OF THAT OVERALL POLICY.

** I CAN ONLY SHARE IN YOUR STATEMENT THAT IT'S IMPORTANT
 ** TO ACHIEVE A BROADER PEACE. THIS WAS ALWAYS TRUE, BEFORE
 ** THIS HAPPENED AND REMAINS TRUE. WE WILL DO EVERYTHING WE
 ** CAN TO ACHIEVE THIS. RIGHT NOW, HOWEVER, WE MUST MAKE
 ** SURE THAT THE ISRAELI FORCES ARE INDEED IN A POSITION TO
 ** MOVE OUT AND THE LEBANESE IN A POSITION TO MOVE IN.

** SHULTZ: I GATHER WE CAN TAKE IT FROM YOUR ANSWER THAT
 ** ISRAEL IS WITHDRAWING IMMEDIATELY, AS LONG AS THE LEBANESE
 ** ARE PREPARED TO ASSUME POSITION.

** ARENS: I WANT TO MAKE SURE THERE ARE NO MISUNDERSTANDINGS.
 ** I HAVE NO AUTHORITY TO GO BEYOND THE CABINET'S DECISIONS.
 ** I HAVE ONLY DESCRIBED TO YOU THE SITUATION ON THE BASIS OF
 ** DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON'S ACCOUNT OF WHAT IS GOING ON NOW
 ** IN LEBANON.

** SHULTZ: I UNDERSTAND, THIS IS JUST DESCRIPTIVE. ALSO,
 ** THOUGH THE PRESIDENT WISHED THAT YOU WITHDRAW IMMEDIATELY
 ** AND TURN OVER THE POSITIONS TO THE LEBANESE, WE ARE NOT
 ** ASKING YOU TO SIMPLY MOVE OUT. WE UNDERSTAND THIS REQUIRES
 ** AN ORDERLY PROCESS.

** ARENS: I THINK I UNDERSTAND THE SPIRIT OF YOUR MESSAGE.

** SHULTZ: THE SPIRIT OF THE MESSAGE IS GRAVE, DISTURBED, AND
 ** HEAVY WITH GRIEF FOR THESE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, FOR

משדר החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

טודי ביותר

מחור 6 דף
מחור 2 עותק 32

** ISRAEL. FOR OURSELVES, FOR EVERYONE INVOLVED.

** ARENS: WE SHARE THIS FEELING.

** SHULTZ: WHENEVER YOU HAVE A RESPONSE, THE PRESIDENT WOULD

** LIKE TO BE INFORMED AT ONCE. YOU KNOW WHERE TO REACH ME AT

** ALL HOURS.

** תע: שהם, סשהם, רהם, סרהם, שהבם, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכו, רט, אמן.
** נכון, מצפה